CherryBomb1991

GypsyRoseLee

Just connecting to the service, a 64bit cpu registers dump is received, and so does several binary code as you can see:

The registers represent an initial cpu state, and we have to reply with the registers result of the binary code execution. This must be automated becouse of the 10 seconds server socket timeout.

The exploit is quite simple, we have to set the cpu registers to this values, execute the code and get resulting registers.

In python we created two structures for the initial state and the ending state.

cpuRegs = {'rax':'','rbx':'','rcx':'','rdx':'','rsi':'','rdi':'','r8':'','r9':'','r10':'','r11':'','r12':'','r13':'','r14':'','r15':''}
finalRegs = {'rax':'','rbx':'','rcx':'','rdx':'','rsi':'','rdi':'','r8':'','r9':'','r10':'','r11':'','r12':'','r13':'','r14':'','r15':''}

We inject at the beginning several movs for setting the initial state:

for r in cpuRegs.keys():

code.append('mov %s, %s' % (r, cpuRegs[r]))

The 64bit compilation of the movs and the binary code, but changing the last ret instruction by a sigtrap "int 3"

We compile with nasm in this way:

os.popen('nasm -f elf64 code.asm')

os.popen('ld -o code code.o ')

And use GDB to execute the code until the sigtrap, and then get the registers

fd = os.popen("gdb code -ex 'r' -ex 'i r' -ex 'quit'",'r')

for l in fd.readlines():

for x in finalRegs.keys():

...

We just parse the registers and send the to the server in the same format, and got the key.

The code:

from libcookie import *

from asm import *

import os

import sys

host = 'catwestern_631d7907670909fc4df2defc13f2057c.quals.shallweplayaga.me'

port = 9999

cpuRegs = {'rax':'','rbx':'','rcx':'','rdx':'','rsi':'','rdi':'','r8':'','r9':'','r10':'','r11':'','r12':'','r13':'','r14':'','r15':''}

finalRegs = {'rax':'','rbx':'','rcx':'','rdx':'','rsi':'','rdi':'','r8':'','r9':'','r10':'','r11':'','r12':'','r13':'','r14':'','r15':''}

fregs = 15

s = Sock(TCP)

s.timeout = 999

s.connect(host,port)

data = s.readUntil('bytes:')

#data = s.read(sz)

#data = s.readAll()

sz = 0

for r in data.split('\n'):

for rk in cpuRegs.keys():

if r.startswith(rk):

cpuRegs[rk] = r.split('=')[1]

if 'bytes' in r:

sz = int(r.split(' ')[3])

binary = data[-sz:]

code = []

print '[',binary,']'

print 'given size:',sz,'bin size:',len(binary)

print cpuRegs

for r in cpuRegs.keys():

code.append('mov %s, %s' % (r, cpuRegs[r]))

#print code

fd = open('code.asm','w')

fd.write('\n'.join(code)+'\n')

fd.close()

Capstone().dump('x86','64',binary,'code.asm')

print 'Compilando ...'

os.popen('nasm -f elf64 code.asm')

os.popen('ld -o code code.o ')

print 'Ejecutando ...'

fd = os.popen("gdb code -ex 'r' -ex 'i r' -ex 'quit'",'r')

for l in fd.readlines():

for x in finalRegs.keys():

if x in l:

l = l.replace('\t',' ')

try:

i = 12

spl = l.split(' ')

if spl[i] == '':

i+=1

print 'reg: ',x

finalRegs[x] = l.split(' ')[i].split('\t')[0]

except:

print 'err: '+l

fregs -= 1

if fregs == 0:

#print 'sending regs ...'

#print finalRegs

buff = []

for k in finalRegs.keys():

buff.append('%s=%s' % (k,finalRegs[k]))

print '\n'.join(buff)+'\n'

print s.readAll()

s.write('\n'.join(buff)+'\n\n\n')

print 'waiting flag ....'

print s.readAll()

print '----- yeah? -----'

s.close()

fd.close()

s.close()

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GypsyRoseLee

Gotanda is OSINT(Open Source Intelligence) Web Extension for Firefox/Chrome.

This Web Extension could search OSINT information from some IOC in web page.(IP,Domain,URL,SNS...etc)

This Repository partly the studying and JavaScript practice.

Download link below.

Usage

Right click highlighted IOC strings, It will show contextmenus.(Or right clicking any link. )

When You want to search using some engine, You choose one of list.

Search Engine List

Name	URL	Category
Domain Tools	https://whois.domaintools.com/	whois Lookup
Security Trails	https://securitytrails.com/	whois lookup
whoisds	https://whoisds.com/	whois lookup
ThreatCrowd	https://www.threatcrowd.org/	Domain, IPv4
AbuseIPDB	https://www.abuseipdb.com/	IPv4
HackerTarget	https://hackertarget.com/	IPv4
Censys	https://censys.io/	IP, Domain
Shodan	https://shodan.io/	IP, Domain
FOFA	https://fofa.so/	IP, Domain
VirusTotal	https://virustotal.com/	IP, Domain, URL,Hash
GreyNoise	https://viz.greynoise.io/	IPv4
IPAlyzer	https://ipalyzer.com/	IPv4
Tor Relay Search	https://metrics.torproject.org/	IP,Domain
Domain Watch	https://domainwat.ch/	Domain, Email,whois lookup
crt.sh	https://crt.sh/	SSL-certificate
SecurityHeaders	https://securityheaders.com/	URL, Domain
DNSlytics	https://dnslytics.com/	IPv4,IPv6,ASN
URLscan	https://urlscan.io/	URL
Ultratools	https://www.ultratools.com/	IPv6
Wayback Machine	https://web.archive.org	URL
aguse	https://www.aguse.jp/	URL
check-host	https://check-host.net/	URL
CIRCL	https://cve.circl.lu/	CVE
FortiGuard	https://fortiguard.com/	CVE
Sploitus	https://sploitus.com/	CVE
Vulmon	https://vulmon.com/	CVE
CXSecurity	https://cxsecurity.com/	CVE
Vulncode-DB	https://www.vulncode-db.com/	CVE
Malshare	https://malshare.com/	MD5 Hash
ThreatCrowd	https://www.threatcrowd.org/	IP,Domain
Hybrid Analysis	https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/	hash
Twitter	https://twitter.com/	SNS, w/TimeLine
Qiita	https://qiita.com	SNS
GitHub	https://github.com	SNS
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/	SNS, w/TimeLine
Instagram	https://www.instagram.com/	SNS
LinkedIn	https://linkedin.com/	SNS
Pinterest	https://www.pinterest.jp	SNS
reddit	https://www.reddit.com/	SNS

About Twitter and FaceBook could search timeline with any words.

Misc

This extension is optimized for the Japanese environment.

Download Gotanda

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GypsyRoseLee

The threat actor behind the supply chain compromise of SolarWinds has continued to expand its malware arsenal with new tools and techniques that were deployed in attacks as early as 2019, once indicative of the elusive nature of the campaigns and the adversary's ability to maintain persistent access for years.

According to cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, which detailed the novel tactics adopted by the Nobelium hacking group last week, two sophisticated malware families were placed on victim systems — a Linux variant of GoldMax and a new implant dubbed TrailBlazer — long before the scale of the attacks came to light.

Nobelium, the Microsoft-assigned moniker for the SolarWinds intrusion in December 2020, is also tracked by the wider cybersecurity community under the names UNC2452 (FireEye), SolarStorm (Unit 42), StellarParticle (CrowdStrike), Dark Halo (Volexity), and Iron Ritual (Secureworks).

The malicious activities have since been attributed to a Russian state-sponsored actor called APT29 (also known as The Dukes and Cozy Bear), a cyber espionage operation associated with the country's Foreign Intelligence Service that's known to be active since at least 2008.

GoldMax (aka SUNSHUTTLE), which was discovered by Microsoft and FireEye (now Mandiant) in March 2021, is a Golang-based malware that acts as a command-and-control backdoor, establishing a secure connection with a remote server to execute arbitrary commands on the compromised machine.

Mandiant also pointed out that Dark Halo actors had used the malware in attacks going back to at least August 2020, or four months before SolarWinds discovered its Orion updates had been tampered with malware designed to drop post-compromise implants against thousands of its customers.

In September 2021, Kaspersky revealed details of a second variant of the GoldMax backdoor called Tomiris that was deployed against several government organizations in an unnamed CIS member state in December 2020 and January 2021.

The latest iteration is a previously undocumented but functionally identical Linux implementation of the second-stage malware that was installed in victim environments in mid-2019, predating all other identified samples built for the Windows platform to date.

Also delivered around the same timeframe was TrailBlazer, a modular backdoor that offers attackers a path to cyber espionage, while sharing commonalities with GoldMax in the way it masquerades its command-and-control (C2) traffic as legitimate Google Notifications HTTP requests.

Other uncommon channels used by the actor to facilitate the attacks include —

Credential hopping for obscuring lateral movement
Office 365 (O365) Service Principal and Application hijacking, impersonation, and manipulation, and
Theft of browser cookies for bypassing multi-factor authentication

Additionally, the operators carried out multiple instances of domain credential theft months apart, each time leveraging a different technique, one among them being the use of Mimikatz password stealer in-memory, from an already compromised host to ensure access for extended periods of time.

"The StellarParticle campaign, associated with the Cozy Bear adversary group, demonstrates this threat actor's extensive knowledge of Windows and Linux operating systems, Microsoft Azure, O365, and Active Directory, and their patience and covert skill set to stay undetected for months — and in some cases, years," the researchers said.

CherryBomb1991

Thursday, January 18, 2024

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